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7KHLQIOXHQFHRIµWRSLFDQGUHVRXUFH¶RQVRPHDVSHFWVRIVRFLDOWKHRULVLQJ 
Abstract 
Developments in sociological theory since the 1960s have been responses to disciplinary 
problems rather than changes in fashion. The problem of topic and resource²where sociol-
ogy has to use everyday understandings and practices as study resources even though they are 
legitimate topics of enquiry²has been an important and sometimes neglected spur to many 
of these developments. The turn to discourse, conversation analysis and the rise of Bourdieu's 
reflexivity are all attempts to address the problem, but each is shown to be unsatisfactory in 
different ways. In summary, they seek to address the issue as requiring either a principled 
methodological or a principled theoretical solution, and neither approach is capable of com-
prehensively addressing the matter. It LVDUJXHGWKDWWKHVHµVROXWLRQV¶GHSHQGLQWXUQRQRQH
RIWZRSDUWLFXODUFRQVWUXDOVRIZKDWWKHµSUREOHP¶FRQVLVWVLQQHLWKHURIZKLFKLVQHFHVVDU\
or coherent. Each, it is argued, depends on a philosophical trick: making language out to need 
formal improvement (the Bertrand Russell trick) or introducing inappropriate scepticism to 
everyday life (the René Descartes trick). It is suggested that treating topic and resource not as 
a problem but as something which opens up new areas of investigation successfully deflates 
the issue and avoids unnecessary theoretical and methodological contortions. 
2 
Introduction 
It is news to no one that a sociologist brought forward in time from the 1950s would find it 
difficult to recognise the contemporary discipline as the same one he or she worked in. An-
JORSKRQHVRFLRORJ\KDVXQGHUJRQHDVHULHVRIµWXUQV¶VLQFHWKHKH\GD\RIVWUXFWXUDOIXQFWLRQ
alism, and once-dominant positivist and quantitative study approaches now compete with a 
host of other positions. Some have claimed this as a triumph for previously marginal, critical 
perspectives (Fine, 1993), while others have suggested that the state of the contemporary dis-
cipline is the outcome of a series of turf-ZDUVEHWZHHQDFDGHPLFµJDQJV¶(Scheff, 1995). Such 
arguments, however, are unconvincing. There were no grand debates between, for instance, 
symbolic interactionists and structural functionalists: the two groups were, and remained, rel-
atively insulated from one another. And there is little evidence that interpretative and qualita-
tive approaches have been more agile or vicious in the academic marketplace than their staid 
predecessors. 
Sociology is a more dispersed and heterogeneous discipline than it used to be because it has 
had to deal with some fundamental theoretical problems, initially raised in the 1960s and 
V,WVµWXUQV¶UHVROYLQJWKHµSUREOHP¶RIVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\WKHOLQJXLVWLFWXUQWKH
postmodern turn, and so on) did not cause disciplinary change but were rather attempts to 
solve these problems, many of which were initially integral to the structural functionalist pro-
ject. A central, and often neglected, dilemma is the problem of topic and resource.1 
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 In some respects, WKLVLVWKHµSUREOHP¶WRZKLFKWKHµUHIOH[LYHWXUQ¶ZDVWKHVROXWLRQ7KH
DSSURDFKHVDGGUHVVHGKHUHZRXOGDOOFODLPWREHµUHIOH[LYH¶EXWWKLVLVDSRRUVWDUWLQJSRLQW 
3 
This paper aims to show how three sociological approaches appeared to solve this problem, 
and to suggest that some of the differences between contemporary sociological perspectives 
rest on the different ways WKHVHµVROXWLRQV¶ZRUNHG. The topic±resource issue, however, will 
be shown to be trickier than it appears: none of these approaches adequately solved it, and the 
arguments that it is an existential problem for sociology are incoherent. Instead it will be ar-
gued that WKHµSUREOHP¶RIWRSLFDQGUHVRXUFHreflects a misunderstanding of the relationships 
EHWZHHQVRFLRORJ\VFLHQFHDQGµPXQGDQHUHDVRQ¶(Pollner, 1987) and, if this misunderstand-
LQJLVFOHDUHGXSWKHµSUREOHP¶HPHUJHVDVDQLQYLWDWLRQWRH[SDQGVRFLRORJ\¶VVFRSHUDWKHU
than to question its disciplinary foundations. 
The argument will start with a specification of how topic and resource was initially framed as 
a problem for sociology. Three putative solutions²the turn to discourse, conversation analy-
sis, and the work of Bourdieu²will be outlined, and their study policies described. The prob-
lems these solutions, in turn, raise will then be considered in terms of the presuppositions un-
derpinning WKHµSUREOHP¶that it is something that requires either (1) a principled methodo-
logical or (2) a principled theoretical solution. These presuppositions will be shown to have 
shaped what might look like a solution. Finally, an alternative construal that requires no such 
µVROXWLRQ¶ZLOOEHLQWURGXFHG. It will be argued that this construal is both more faithful to the 
way the issue was originally framed, and also one that offers more expansive and open study 
possibilities. 
                                                 
DVZKDWµUHIOH[LYLW\¶PLJKWFRQVLVWLQGHSHQGVRQKRZLWDGGUHVVHVWKHSUREOHP (Lynch, 
2000). 
4 
The problem of topic and resource 
Many of the resources sociologists use to account for social activities are, themselves, social 
phenomena, and so can be analysed as sociological topics in their own right. Mathematical 
practices are an example: these are used, amongst other things, to measure the statistical sig-
nificance of survey results, to count how many people are incumbents of different social cate-
gories, and to measure the distribution of social phenomena (attitudes, illnesses, tastes, and so 
on) across populations. The practice of doing mathematics is itself, however, a social phe-
nomenon, and therefore has been subject to sociological investigation (Bloor, 1987; 
Greiffenhagen & Sharrock, 2011). This is not a problem: one could conduct sociological in-
vestigations into interviewing, the organisation of focus groups, the design of survey instru-
ments, etc., etc., without those studies rendering any of those phenomena problematic as de-
vices sociologists can use for doing studies. 
Topic and resource becomes a problem when mundane, common-sense reasoning is consid-
ered. Such mundane understandings underpin all forms of social activity, are necessarily 
taken for granted, and are seldom treated as topics of enquiry in their own right, perhaps be-
caXVHRIWKHLUYHU\WULYLDOLW\DQGXELTXLW\7KLVLVVXHZDVDWWKHKHDUWRI*DUILQNHO¶Vearly 
work: 
In that commonsense activities and environments are simultaneously the topic as 
well as the feature of sociological inquiries, a concern for describing the actual 
IHDWXUHVRIVRFLRORJ\¶VDWWLWXGHDQGPHWKRGVDVSRVVLEOHPRGLILFDWLRQVRIWKHDWWL
WXGHDQGPHWKRGVRIFRPPRQVHQVHWKHµGLVFRYHU\RIFXOWXUH¶UHFRQVWUXFWVWKH
5 
problems of the sociology of knowledge and locates them at the heart of the soci-
ological enterprise and with full seriousness (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 236). 
The problem is exacerbated when attention shifts away from the topics that sociology has 
W\SLFDOO\QHJOHFWHGDQGWRZDUGVWKHUHVRXUFHVLWXVHVWRSXUVXHLQYHVWLJDWLRQV7KHVHµUH
VRXUFHV¶GHSHQGon a range of everyday competences²most importantly the capacity to 
speak and understand a natural language²which themselves require examination not simply 
as interesting topics but, crucially, as fundamental disciplinary phenomena in their own right. 
To treat this seriously would require a more radical reformulation of what sociology should 
be doing: 
7KHµUHGLVFRYHU\¶RIFRPPRQVHQVHLVSRVVLEOHSHUKDSVEHFDXVHSURIHVVLRQDOVR
ciologists, like members, have had too much to do with common sense 
knowledge of social structures as both a topic and a resource for their inquiries 
DQGQRWHQRXJKWRGRZLWKLWRQO\DQGH[FOXVLYHO\DVVRFLRORJ\¶VSURJUDPPDWLF
topic (Garfinkel, 1964, p. 250). 
Sociology, Garfinkel seems to be arguing, must find a way to transcend its dependence on 
µFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶both to secure its own foundations and WRIDFLOLWDWHWKHµGLVFRYHU\RIFXO
WXUH¶8QWLOLWKDVGRQHWKLVVRFLRORJ\LVLQWURXEOHDVWZRRI*DUILQNHO¶VWKHQVWXGHQWV
pointed out: 
6RFLRORJ\¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHOD\PHPEHU¶VIRUPXOation of the formal and sub-
VWDQWLYHIHDWXUHVRIVRFLRORJ\¶VWRSLFDOFRQFHUQVPDNHVVRFLRORJ\DQLQWHJUDOIHD
ture of the very order of affairs it seeks to describe. It makes sociology into an 
6 
eminently folk discipline deprived of any prospect or hope of making fundamen-
tal structures of folk activity a phenomenon (Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970, p. 82). 
Later still, Garfinkel appeared to treat the problem as incapable of a principled solution that 
would not require a wholesale respecification of the sociological project: 
The fact that natural language serves persons doing sociology, laymen or profes-
sionals, as circumstances, as topics, and as resources of their inquiries, furnishes 
to the technology of their inquiries and to their practical sociological reasoning its 
circumstances, its topics, and its resources. That reflexivity is encountered by so-
ciologists in the actual occasions of their inquiries as indexical properties of natu-
ral language. These properties are sometimes characterised by summarily observ-
ing that a description, for example, in the ways it may be a constituent part of the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVLWGHVFULEHVLQHQGOHVVZD\VDQGXQDYRLGDEO\µHODERUDWHV¶WKRVH
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGLVµHODERUDWHG¶E\WKHP7KDWUHIOH[LYLW\DVVXUHVWRQDWXUal lan-
guage characteristic indexical properties such as the following: The definiteness 
of expressions resides in their consequences; definitions can be used to assure a 
GHILQLWHFROOHFWLRQRIµFRQVLGHUDWLRQV¶ZLWKRXWSURYLGLQJDERXQGDU\WKHGHILQLWH
ness of a collection is assured by circumstantial possibilities of indefinite elabora-
tion (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 338). 
Language use here, pace Wittgenstein (2009), is always embedded in the activities it is a part 
of. The sense of utterances depends on the circumstances of their production and understand-
7 
ing (they are µLQGH[LFDO¶DQGthose utterances, in part at least, determine what those circum-
stances are. This is as true for sociologists as for everyone else, with complex implications 
for what kinds of things sociology can do and what kinds of claims it can make about what it 
is doing. 
Topic and resource, as a µproblem¶, has two elements. Firstly, sociology must have a clear 
understanding of the resources it uses. Secondly, because those resources necessarily include 
the shared common-sense understandings members of society use to make sense of the world, 
those common-sense understandings must themselves be described and understood. Topic±
resource is a problem because, in order to undertake that description, some resources must be 
used²and it is unclear what they might be, how they might be used, and what the status of 
descriptions made under their auspices might have. Would the epistemological foundations of 
VXFKGHVFULSWLRQVEHµVFLHQWLILF¶PHUHO\µFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶RUVRPHK\EULGRIWKHWZR" 
Some solutions to the topic and resource problem 
1. Topic and resource as a critique of social science: the turn to discourse 
As a critique of social science, the topic and resource problem motivated much of the µWXUQWR
GLVFRXUVH¶LQSDUWLFXODULQWKHVRFLRORJ\RIVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH66.Towards the end of 
the 1970s there was an increasing interest in conducting descriptive studies of what scientists 
actually do in their day-to-day work as scientists. Laboratory studies (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; 
Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Lynch, 1985)²ethnographic investigations of laboratory prac-
8 
tice²described the mundane competences scientists rely upon to produce warrantable scien-
tific findings. A key finding of these studies was that there is a problematic relationship be-
tween what scientists do and what scientists say: Latour (1987) went so far as to suggest that 
VFLHQFHLVµ-DQXV-IDFHG¶DQGWKDWWKHWZRFDWHJRULHVDUHPXWXDOO\FRQWUDGLFWRU\$PRUHPRG
est claim was that sFLHQWLILFZULWLQJµLQVFULSWLRQ¶GRHVQRWUHIOHFWWKHPHVV\FRQWUDGLFWRU\
VLWXDWHGQDWXUHRIODERUDWRU\SUDFWLFHDQGWKDWVFLHQWLVWV¶FODLPVVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHWUHDWHG
DVVRFLDOSURGXFWLRQVµFRQVWUXFWLRQV¶UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\VWDWHPHQWVDERXWthe nature of the 
world. 
This led to an increasing interest in scientific disputes and the politics of scientific activi-
ties²why one account, as a µYHUVLRQ¶of reality, is chosen over another. In their Opening 
3DQGRUD¶V%R[, Gilbert and Mulkay stressed that these disagreements are not just problems 
for scientists, but also problematise the sociological description of their activities. Following 
=LPPHUPDQDQG3ROOQHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVRFLRORJ\DVDµIRONGLVFLSOLQH¶WKH\DUJXHd that 
µVRFLRORJLVWV¶DWWHmpts to tell the story of a particular social setting or to formulate the way in 
ZKLFKVRFLDOOLIHRSHUDWHVDUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQVDWLVIDFWRU\«EHFDXVHWKH\LPSO\XQMXVWLIL
ably that the analyst can reconcile his version of events with all the multiple and divergent 
YHUVLRQVJHQHUDWHGE\WKHDFWRUVWKHPVHOYHV¶(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984, p. 2). Just as different 
µDFWRUV¶XQGHUVWDQGWKHZRUOGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VWKHVRFLRORJLVW¶VWDNHRQZKDWLVJRLQJRQLQD
setting is deflated to become just another version of events. All that can be done is to de-
VFULEHDVEHVWDVSRVVLEOHKRZGLIIHUHQFHVPDQLIHVWWKHPVHOYHVWKURXJKµGLVFRXUVH¶: to elab-
orate the versions of reality different participants advocate. This turn to language was paral-
leled in anthropology: 
9 
Thus, in short, an ethnography should not be homological, plagiaristic, positivist, 
essentialist, or analogical. The name of the game now is aesthetics, pastiche, col-
lage, juxtaposition, framing, heteroglossia, polyphony/polyvocality, or at the very 
least, dialogue (Caplan, 1988, p. 9). 
In short, the problematic relationship between topics of enquiry and resources for investiga-
tion became used as a warrant for both criticising what had come before and suggesting that 
new literary devices and methodological styles are required to embrace the partial²perhaps 
impossible²nature of sociological claims-making. 6XFKµQHZOLWHUDU\WHFKQLTXHV¶IHGEDFN
into the sociology of knowledge (Ashmore, 1989; Woolgar, 1988)2 and became briefly fash-
ionable in more mainstream sociology. TKHQRWLRQWKDWWKHVRFLRORJLVW¶VDFFRXQWZDVSULYL
OHJHGRYHUWKRVHRIKLVRUKHUµSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZDVDEDQGRQHG This perspective found its con-
temporary representative in Bruno Latour¶V actor-network theory, which acknowledges the 
existence of order in activities rather more clearly than its predecessors but which maintains 
their deflationary tactics: 
[I]nstead of taking a reasonable position and imposing some order beforehand, 
ANT claims to be able to find order much better after having let the actors deploy 
the full range of controversies in which they are immersed. It is as if we were say-
LQJWRWKHDFWRUVµ:HZRQ¶WWU\WRGLVFLSOLQH\RXWRPDNH\RXILWLQWRRXUFDWHJR
ries; we will let you deploy your own worlds, and only later will we ask you to 
                                                 
2
 7UHYRU3LQFK¶VSDSHURQQHZOLWHUDU\IRUPVLQVRFLRORJ\ was an analytically appropriate 
pastiche of this approach, co-authored with himself (Pinch & Pinch, 1988). 
10 
explain hRZ\RXFDPHDERXWVHWWOLQJWKHP¶7KHWDVNRIGHILQLQJDQGRUGHULQJWKH
social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst. This is 
why, to regain some sense of order, the best solution is to trace connections be-
tween the controversies themselves rather than try to decide how to settle any 
given controversy. The search for order, rigor, and pattern is by no means aban-
doned. It is simply relocated one step further into abstraction so that actors are al-
lowed to unfold their own differing cosmos, no matter how counter-intuitive they 
appear (Latour, 2005, p. 34). 
Such approaches as these proved unsatisfactory to many. If sociological texts themselves are 
µYXOQHUDEOHWRGHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶(Collins & Yearley, 1992, p. 304) a reasonable question might 
be what point there is to producing them. :KLOHWKHµGLVFXUVLYHWXUQ¶ZDVZUHVWOLQJZLWKWKH
topic±resource problem in its own way, however, other developments were going on. 
2. Topic and resource as foundational to a scientific sociology: conversation analysis 
Firstly, conversation analysis (CA) was becoming increasingly professionalised. Trading on 
its roots in ethnomethodology, while neglecting much of the work of the late Harvey Sacks, 
some contemporary conversation analysts FODLPWRKDYHµRYHUFRPH¶WKHWRSLF±resource prob-
lem by having transcended &$¶V lay, vernacular roots: CA is now µVFLHQWLILF¶(Arminen, 
2008). Its scientific status is underwritten by the proper use of a standardised system of nota-
tion, originally devised E\*DLO-HIIHUVRQDOORZLQJ&$¶VDQDO\VHVWREHH[DPLQHGUHSOLFDWHG
or challenged by other competent practitioners (Macbeth & Wong, 2016; Macbeth, Wong, & 
Lynch, 2016): 
11 
Jeffersonian transcription provides a shared, standard system for rendering talk-
in-interaction in a way that can be textually reproduced. It is compact, transporta-
ble and reproducible, and provides for easy random access unlike audio or video 
records. CA transcription is a fundamental resource for data sessions, presenta-
tions and journal articles, and, as such, it is often the medium through which ana-
O\VWVHQFRXQWHUDQGHYDOXDWHHDFKRWKHU¶VZRUN,WLVWKHUHIRUHDWWKHFHQWHURIWKH
epistemic culture of Conversation Analysis. CA transcription has evolved, and 
will continue to evolve, with the gradual progression of conversation analytic 
studies of interaction (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013, p. 75). 
6XFKDQDSSURDFKIDFLOLWDWHVWKHXVHRI&$DVDVWDQGDUGLVHGDQGµH[SHUW¶DSSURDFKWRKXPDQ
DFWLYLWLHVDOORZLQJWKHDQDO\VW¶VUHGHVFULSWLRQRIZKDWLVµUHDOO\¶JRLQJRQWREHVXEVWLWXWHG
IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶µOD\¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIZKDWWKH\DUHXSWR&$FDQWKXVEHµDSSOLHG¶WR
compare different settings (Drew & Heritage, 1993), provide insight into communicative 
problems (Wilkinson, 2014), gender relations (Kitzinger, 2000), education (Gardner, 2013), 
and so on. In short, CA as the study of a topic, ordinary talk, has been superseded by CA as a 
legitimate resource, a way of professionally studying the social world. 
'RLQJ&$LVQRWWRPRVWVRFLRORJLVWV¶ tastes, however. It is time-consuming and difficult to 
produce transcripts as detailed as those undertaken by Gail Jefferson (see, for instance, the 
complex transcriptions of laughter in Jefferson, 2004, LQZKLFKWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµDSSO\LQJ¶
CA is systematically rejected), and claims about matters extrinsic to the organisation of talk 
are discouraged. 
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3. Topic and resource as a warrant for renewed theory: Pierre Bourdieu 
:KLOHµOLWHUDU\¶'$DQG&$ZHUHRIRQO\PDUJLQDOLQWHUHVW3LHUUH%RXUGLHX¶VLQIOXHQFe on 
sociology, in particular in the UK, cannot be overstated. During the 1990s and 2000s he be-
came a key theoretical resource for doing studies, and his influence has not diminished signif-
icantly in mainstream sociology. His work offered a more palatable solution to the topic±re-
source problem, via his version of reflexivity: 
I know that I am caught up and comprehended in the world that I take as my ob-
ject. I cannot take up a position, as a scientist, on the struggles over the truth of 
the social world without knowing I am doing so, that the only truth is that truth is 
a stake in struggles as much within the scientific world (the sociological field) as 
in the social world that this scientific world takes as its object (every agent has his 
µLGLRWLF¶YLVLRQRI the world, which he aims to impose²insult, for example, being 
a form of wild exercise of symbolic power) and with respect to which its strug-
gles over truth are engaged. In saying that, and in recommending the practice of 
reflexivity, I am also aware of handing over to others instruments which they can 
turn against me to subject me to objectification²but in so doing, they show that I 
am right (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 115). 
%RXUGLHXUHFRJQLVHGWKDWVRFLRORJ\¶VOHJLWLPDWHSXUYLHZLQFOXGHGVRFLRORJ\LWVHOIDQGWKDt 
WKLVµUHIOH[LYH¶UHODWLRQVKLSFRXOGQRWEHRYHUFRPH%\WXUQLQJDQDO\WLFDODWWHQWLRQWRWKH
practices of sociologists²by stepping back from sociology to see how it relates to its objects 
of study²however, the foundations of the discipline could be shored up: 
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I wanted less to observe the observer as an individual, which is in itself not par-
ticularly interesting, than to observe the effects produced on the observation, on 
the description of the thing observed, by the situation of the observer²to uncover 
all the presuppositions inherent in the theoretical posture as an external, remote, 
distant, or, quite simply, non-practical, non-committed, non-involved vision. And 
it struck me that there was an entire, basically false social philosophy which 
stemmed from tKHIDFWWKDWWKHHWKQRORJLVWKDVµQRWKLQJWRGR¶ZLWKWKHSHRSOHKH
studies, with their practices and their representations, except to study them: there 
is an enormous difference between trying to understand the nature of matrimonial 
relations between two families so as to get your son or daughter married off, in-
vesting the same interest in this as people in our own world invest in their choice 
of the best school for their son or daughter, and trying to understand these rela-
tions so as to construct a theoretical model of them (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 60). 
By treating practices of theorising as systematically different WRWKHµSUDFWLFDO¶FRQFHUQVRI
members of society, and²for Bourdieu²the reflexive examination of those practices as 
themselves socially situated phenomena, an apparent theoretical solution to the problem of 
topic and resource appeared. This was (to a degree) convincing, and certainly more amenable 
to conventional sociological work than its PRUHµUDGLFDO¶DOWHUQDWLYHV$WKHRU\IRXQGHGRQD
µUHIOH[LYH¶VWXG\RIZKDWVRFLRORJLVWVGRZKLOHSHUKDSVDOLWWOHRGGSURYLGHGPDQ\VRFLROR
gists with a warrant to continue more-or-less business as usual. 
%RXUGLHXDWWHPSWHGWRGLVWLQJXLVKKLVSURMHFWIURP*DUILQNHO¶V by insisting on the reality of 
human agents and the objectivity of social structures as givensµ>$@OWKRXJKWKH\SRLQWRXW
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that the social world is constructed, they forget that the constructors are themselves socially 
constructed and that their construction depends on their position in the objective social space 
WKDWVFLHQFHKDVWRFRQVWUXFW¶ (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 93). The examination of sociology as a so-
ciological phenomenon only goes so far, therefore, as²MXVWOLNHµVFLHQFH¶µthe truth of the 
social world¶DQGso on²there is no clear reason why these concepts cannot themselves be 
made the topics of description or criticism. Topic±resource, therefore, is used to justify a 
modification of sociological theory rather than a root-and-branch re-examination. 
Problems with the solutions 
7KHSUREOHPVZLWKWKHVHµVROXWLRQV¶LVWKDWHDFKFRQVWUXHVWKHSUREOHPRIWRSLF±resource dif-
ferently. DA and actor-network theory make the problem out to be one of providing a con-
text-VHQVLWLYHDFFRXQWRIDFKDRWLFDQGGLVSXWHGZRUOG7RDYRLGEHLQJDµIRONGLVFLSOLQH¶VR
FLRORJ\PXVWSURGXFHWH[WVWKDWUHIOHFWWKHµYHUVLRQV¶SHRSOHFRQVWUXFWDQGXVHQHLWKHUEX\LQJ
into the reality of any of those versions nor constructing a competing, scholarly alternative. 
Sociology is deflated by topic±resource, and its role becomes to reflect diversity and disa-
greement rather than to strive to produce definitive accounts. 
CA makes the problem out to be one of overcoming the lay, common-sense nature of analy-
sis. By describing language use in fine detail, and by producing standardised inscriptions of 
ordinary talk, it is possible to replace vernacular understandings with technical, professional 
ones. CA analyses stand as technical accounts of ordinary talk, using only analytical re-
sources that have shed their mundane, reflexive roots. 
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Bourdieu, finally, understands the problem to be one of the relationship between observer and 
observed, and claims to have transcended it by taking a step back from sociology to see how 
it operates in the world. By taking this step back, by undertaking a sociology of sociology, he 
claims to have seen how the topic±resource issue can be overcome²by recognising and ac-
knowleGJLQJWKHGXDOLW\RIWKHVRFLRORJLVW¶VSRVLWLRQDVERWKµVFLHQWLVW¶DQGµSDUWLFLSDQW¶ 
(DFKµVROXWLRQ¶WKHUHIRUHLVXQDFFHSWDEOHWRWKHRWKHUVbecause they start from different 
places they end up in different places, as one might expect. DA, CA and Bourdieu are not, 
therefore, µFRPSHWLQJVROXWLRQV¶EXWUDWKHUWKHUHVXOWRIFRPSHWLQJconstruals of what topic±
resource entails. The question, then, shifts to how one should construe the topic±resource 
problem. To answer this requires a return to its original presentation, and some of the claims 
made about it at the time. -XVWDV*DUILQNHO¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHµSUREOHP¶VKLIWHGLQLWVHP
phases over the course of the 1960s, his collaborators and students, similarly, construed the 
problem in rather different wa\V7RLOOXVWUDWHWKHVHGLIIHUHQFHVWZRLQIOXHQWLDOµVROXWLRQV¶WR
the problem²FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVZLWK*DUILQNHO¶VZRUN²will be described. 
µ6RFLRORJLFDO'HVFULSWLRQ¶WKH%HUWUDQG5XVVHOOWULFN 
The first construal of the problem was that offered by Harvey Sacks in an early position piece 
on how he saw his project (which ultimately became CA) relating to more conventional soci-
ology. Sacks (1963, p. 4) VRXJKWµWRPDNHFXUUHQWVRFLRORJ\VWUDQJH¶, emhpasising the de-
scriptive nature of his approach, in contrast to the then-popular rationales for sociology that 
construed it as either explanatory or tied to the evaluation or generation of theory: 
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[E]ven if it can be said that persons produce descriptions of the social world, the 
task of sociology is not to clarify WKHVHRUWRµJHWWKHPRQWKHUHFRUG¶RUWRFULWL
cize them, but to describe them. That persons describe social life (if they can be 
conceived as doing so) is a happening of the subject quite as any other happening 
of any other subject in the sense that it poses the job of sociology, and in contrast 
ZLWKLWSURYLGLQJDVROXWLRQWRVRFLRORJ\¶VSUREOHPRIGHVFULELQJWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI
its subject matter (Sacks, 1963, p. 7). 
Description²how people describe the world²LVWKHFHQWUDOFRQFHUQRI6DFNV¶VSDSHU$
pUREOHPSHUKDSVWKHSUREOHPIRUVRFLRORJLVWVLVWKDWWKH\XVHVXFKµOD\¶GHVFULSWLRQVDVUH
sources for doing studies as, for example, in interviews, surveys, questionnaires, and so on. 
:KDWµUHVSRQGHQWV¶say is treated as having something to do with what they do, and the for-
mer is treated as a description of the latter for sociological purposes. The problem for sociol-
ogists undertaking studies, therefore, becomes one of reconciling what is said²how features 
of the social world are described²with what those features of the world actually are. This is 
a problem because, Sacks argues, while the latter are subjected to sociological description the 
IRUPHUDUHLQFRUSRUDWHGµDVLV¶ 
The emergence of sociology will take a different course (when it emerges) from 
that of other sciences because sociology, to emerge, must free itself not from phi-
losophy but from the common-VHQVHSHUVSHFWLYH«7KHµGLVFRYHU\¶RIWKHFRP
mon-sense world is important as the discovery of a problem only, and not as the 
discovery of a sociological resource (Sacks, 1963, p. 10±11). 
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A trick is being played here. Sociology is not simply an odd way of doing things, but is in 
need of improvement. Its use of common-sense resources (natural language use) poses a 
SUREOHPQRWEHFDXVHWKHLUµGLVFRYHU\¶RSens up for investigation new and interesting phe-
QRPHQDEXWEHFDXVHVRFLRORJ\¶VIDLOXUHWRH[DPLQHWKHPUHSUHVHQWVDlack of rigour. The dis-
cipline, according to Sacks, cannot be scientific until this is overcome: 
[A]t least some sociologists seek to make a science of the discipline; this is a con-
cern I share, and it is only from the perspective of such a concern that the ensuing 
discussion seems appropriate. As scientists we seek to produce a literal descrip-
tion of our subject matter. In order to describe we construct (or adapt for our 
uses) a language. While to begin with our language may be crude, one rule must 
constantly be attended to: whatever we take as subject music be described; noth-
ing we take as subject can appear as part of our descriptive apparatus unless it it-
self has been described (Sacks, 1963, p. 2). 
Sacks is not, therefore, just pointing towards an area for potential investigation. He is taking 
WKHµGLVFRYHU\¶RIWKHFRPPRQ-VHQVHZRUOGWREHDZDUUDQWIRUIRXQGLQJDWUXO\µVFLHQWLILF¶
VRFLRORJ\EDVHGRQµOLWHUDOGHVFULSWLRQV¶RILWVSKHQRPHQD7KLVPHDQVGHYLVLQJDWHFKQLFDO
language which will allow for further description prior to other activities being undertaken. 
7KLVWHFKQLFDOODQJXDJHZDVZKDWHPHUJHGRYHUWKHFRXUVHRI6DFNV¶VDQGKLVFROOHDJXHV¶
study of ordinary conversation over the decade following the publication of this paper. The 
formal properties of language use identified by CA, initially using lay understandings, come 
to supersede lay understandings and place the programme on a more solid analytical footing. 
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Sacks here is adopting the same approach as that found LQ%HUWUDQG5XVVHOO¶V(e.g., 1905) 
early philosophy. Something is being done²for Sacks people producing descriptions, for 
5XVVHOOSHRSOHXVLQJWKHZRUGµWKH¶²that is clearly ubiquitous, that is used naively as a re-
source by analysts, and that should legitimately be (one of) the topics they are investigating. 
Its presence renders the scientific (Sacks) or logical (Russell) bases of the rest of their disci-
plines (sociology and logical philosophy respectively) questionable. By treating it as a topic, 
describing it, and making those practices of topicalising and description the bases of further 
ZRUNLWZLOOEHSRVVLEOHWRRYHUFRPHWKDWµTXHVWLRQDEOHQHVV¶)RU6DFNVDVIRU5XVVHOOWKH
µVKDSH¶RIZKDWWKLVµQHZ¶IRUPRIWKHGLVFLSOLQHZLOOORRNOLNHLVDOUHDG\known: it will be an 
empirical, scientific, body of work, based on clear and distinct terms of reference. The as-
sumption for Sacks, as for Russell, is that the common-sense basis of natural language use 
should be overcome to produce a properly scientific method of analysis as, unless this hap-
pens, such analyses must necessarily rest on unsecured and possibly erroneous foundations. 
7KHUHDUHWZRSUREOHPVZLWKWKLVDSSURDFK)LUVWO\LWUHTXLUHVµGHVFULSWLRQV¶WREHVHSDUDWHG
IURPµWKHWKLQJVEHLQJGHVFULEHG¶. Effectively what people say²and what sociologists 
claim²is being treated as a commentary on, or description of, separate phenomena. This is 
the nominalism rejected by, amongst others, Garfinkel (& Sacks, 1970) and Wittgenstein 
(2009), who emphasised the situated and contextual nature of language use. Language is split 
from the circumstances of its use, and the ways those circumstances are given meaning by 
language is neglected, in order to achieve a one-to-one relationship between a separated de-
scription and the thing it describes. 
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6HFRQGO\6DFNV¶VDFFRXQWSUHVXSSRVHVWKDWWKHSUHFRQFHSWLRQVRIVFLHQWLILFPHWKRGDUHWKH
actual ways it gets done. The complex, situated practices of scientists undertaking research 
DUHUHGXFHGWRDQRWLRQRIVFLHQFHDVµIRUPDOGHVFULSWLRQ¶DQGVRFLRORJ\PXVWµIUHHLWVHOI¶
from both philosophy and common-sense to produce such accounts itself. As Winch (1990) 
KDVLW6DFNVLVEX\LQJLQWRDSLFWXUHRISKLORVRSK\WKDWPDNHVLWDQµXQGHUODERXUHU¶WRVFL
ence, and neglecting the strong relationships between ordinary language philosophy and the 
aims and objectives of sociology. 
Construing topic±resource as something amenable to a methodological solution cannot over-
come these problems. Language must be treated as standing in an ostensive definitional rela-
WLRQVKLSWRWKHWKLQJVLWLVµDERXW¶DQGDSDUWLFXODUFRQVWUXDORIµVFLHQFH¶PXVWEHDFFHSWHGIRU
the project to get off the ground. What people say is treated as a description of what they do, 
DQGWKHVRFLRORJLVW¶VDFFRXQWDVDSRWHQWially competing description. The idea that language is 
primarily about description, and that this somehow stands in an ironic relationship to socio-
logical description, is itself an assumption that need not be made. 
µ7KH(YHU\GD\:RUOGDVD3KHQRPHQRQ¶the René Descartes trick 
Zimmerman and Pollner, in contrast, construed the topic±resource problem as being about so-
FLRORJ\¶VWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFH 
6RFLRORJ\VKDUHVZLWKµOD\¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHVRFLDOZRUOGLWVWHUPVRIUHIHU
HQFHµGHOLQTXHQF\¶IRULQVWDQFHDQGVRFDQRQO\HYHUEHDµIRONGLVFLSOLQH¶XQWLO
it liberates itself from these. It is part of society, an alternative way of looking at 
things, rather than a means of studying society. Sometimes sociologists will agree 
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with members, sometimes they will disagree²EXWHLWKHUZD\µ>R@QFHOD\PHP
EHUV¶DFFRXQWVDUHWKHREMHFWRIHYDOXDWLRQWKHSURIHVVLRQDOLQYHVWLJDWRUKDVLP
plicitly raised the lay member to the status of a professional colleague (however 
incompetent)¶(Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970, p. 87). 
7KH\UHFRPPHQGWUHDWLQJVXFKIHDWXUHVDVDVHWWLQJ¶VµKLVWRULFDOFRQWLQXLW\LWVVWUXFWXUHRI
rules and the relationship of activities within it to those rules, and the ascribed (or achieved) 
VWDWXVHVRILWVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SDVachievements, µRFFDVLRQHG¶E\SDUWLHVWRWKHVHWWLQJ7KH
job of sociology is to describe those achievements and examine their organisation. How this 
might be undertaken, however, is a problem. Zimmerman and Pollner construe this achieve-
PHQWDVµWKHRFFDVLRQHGFRUSXVRI VHWWLQJIHDWXUHV¶KRZPHPEHUVDVVHPEOHIHDWXUHVWKDWDUH
GHHPHGWREHUHOHYDQWWRZKDWWKHVHWWLQJµLV¶7KHWULFNWRPDNHWKLVDtheoretical matter is 
played later: 
7KHRFFDVLRQHGFRUSXVLVWKXVFRQFHLYHGWRFRQVLVWLQPHPEHUV¶PHWKRGVRIH[
hibiting the connectedness, objectivity, orderliness, and relevance of the features 
of any particular setting as features in, of, and linked with a more encompassing, 
RQJRLQJVHWWLQJW\SLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµWKHVRFLHW\¶7KHZRUNRIWKHRFFDVLRQHG
corpus is the worNRIGLVSOD\LQJWKHVRFLHW\µLQEDFNRI¶WKHYDULRXVVLWXDWHGDS
pearances constituent of everyday, located scenes (Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970, 
p. 99). 
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7KHWULFNLVWKHVXGGHQUHDSSHDUDQFHRIµWKHVRFLHW\¶:KHUHGRHVWKLVFRPHIURP"*LYHQWKH
µUHGXFWLRQ¶WKat Zimmerman and Pollner conducted on the lay understanding of what consti-
tutes context²it is something external and constraining²WKHUHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµVRFLHW\¶KHUH
is jarring. After all, the argument being pursued is one that is premised on the idea that one 
should not buy into the terms of reference used by members of society as if they were un-
SUREOHPDWLFDQDO\WLFDOUHVRXUFHV7KDWWKHUHLVDµPRUHHQFRPSDVVLQJRQJRLQJVHWWLQJ¶KRZ
ever, is itself one such term of reference. And the reintroduction of this term as a theoretical 
convenience has serious theoretical consequences. This is the Rene Descartes trick, in 
which²after systematically ruling out of analytical bounds everything except a single phe-
nomenon (for Descartes, using systematic doubt, the cogito, for Zimmerman and Pollner, us-
ing Husserlian bracketing, the accomplished situation)²something previously discarded (for 
Descartes, God, for Zimmerman and Pollner, society) is brought back under, now, radically 
different conditions. 
Zimmerman and Pollner make a series of assumptions to warrant their construal of topic±re-
VRXUFHDQGLWVµVROXWLRQ¶)LUVWO\DOWKRXJKWKH\GRQRWPDNHODQJXDJHXVHRXWWREHSXUHO\GH
VFULSWLYHWKH\GRFRQVWUXHHYHU\GD\XQGHUVWDQGLQJVDVµWKHRULHV¶LQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHVRFLo-
logically interesting)VRFLRORJLVWVDQGSROLFHPHQ>VLF@IRULQVWDQFHµPD\HQWHUWDLQYHU\GLI
IHUHQWWKHRULHVRIKRZDSHUVRQFRPHVWREHDMXYHQLOHGHOLQTXHQW¶(Zimmerman & Pollner, 
1970, p. 81). Although Zimmerman and Pollner go on to question whether it is appropriate 
IRUOD\FRQFHSWVVXFKDVµMXYHQLOHGHOLQTXHQF\¶WRPDNHWKHLUZD\XQH[DPLQHGLQWRVRFLRO
ogy, the idea that everyday understandings are something like theories runs through their ac-
count. What is occasioned as part of a setting is treated as a theory of what that setting is, 
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and²particularly where competing or conflicting definitions and construals appear²arbitrat-
ing between the alternatives is seen as a political and conceptual task rather than a practical 
one (Cf. Pollner, 1975). 
SecondlyPHPEHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHZRUOGDUHVXEWO\LURQLFLVHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH
ZRUOGIRULQVWDQFHLVµWDNHQIRUJUDQWHG¶DQGWKHLGHDWKDWGLIIHUHQWSHRSOHVHHWKHZRUOGLQ
EURDGO\WKHVDPHZD\VLVµPHUHO\DVVXPHG¶(Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970, p. 84). The mean-
ing of µDVVXPSWLRQ¶ here is not the same as that intended by Schütz, who Zimmerman and 
3ROOQHUDUHUHIHUHQFLQJ)RU6FKW]µ,DSSUHKHQGWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\RQO\PHGLDWHO\E\PHDQV
RIW\SLILFDWLRQV¶ (Schutz, 1964, p. 42).3 What for Zimmerman and Pollner is a mere assump-
WLRQLVIRU6FKW]SDUWRIWKHµDWWLWXGHRIGDLO\OLIH¶WKHZD\PHPEHUVRIVRFLHW\necessarily 
experience one another and their surroundings. Schütz here is explicitly attacking Cartesian 
doubt by pointing out that, amongst other things, we assume things are what they seem unless 
there are particular reasons not to. Zimmerman and Pollner, on the other hand, by making this 
aspect of everyday understandings one of defining situations rather than taking things for 
granted open up the possibility of treating the taken-for-granted as something arrived at by 
choice. 
Finally, Zimmerman and Pollner neglect the orderliness of everyday life. The fact that things 
get done in routine ways, without much thought, repetitively and without trouble does not ap-
                                                 
3
 6FKW]¶VVXUQDPHZDVJLYHQWKHYDULDQWVSHOOLQJVµ6FKXHW]¶RUµ6FKXW]¶LQGLIIHUHQWSXEOLFD
tions. The spelling as per publication is given for citation purposes. 
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pear as a sociological phenomenon, but is rather the outcome of a series of otherwise dis-
jointed occasioned settings. The facts that parties to those settings overwhelmingly organise 
them to be orderly, that a proper orientation to the orderly features of everyday life is insisted 
upon by members (as shown, inter aliaE\*DUILQNHO¶V1963 breaching procedures), and 
that²without such order²WKHUHFRXOGEHQRVWDEOHµEDFNJURXQG¶WRDFWLYLWLHVGRHVQRWDS
pear. Order, for Zimmerman and Pollner, is an emergent property of occasioned settings ra-
ther than a prerequisite of their sensible constitution. Again, Zimmerman and Pollner cherry-
pick some ideas from 6FKW]¶VZRUN but neglect others: µVXFKSURFHVVHV²typical experi-
HQFHVRIµVRPHRQH¶²exhibit the idHDOL]DWLRQµDJDLQDQGDJDLQ¶, i.e., of typical anonymous 
UHSHDWDELOLW\¶ (Schutz, 1964, p. 44). 
Zimmerman and Pollner, and Sacks, in their different ways, treat topic±resource as a discipli-
nary problem. A principled solution must be found, whether it rests on describing ordinary 
language use to provide a methodologically sound foundation for further studies (Sacks), or 
VXVSHQGLQJMXGJHPHQWRQWKHµUHDOLW\¶RIWKHHYHU\GD\ZRUOGWRDOORZIRUPRUHFRKHUHQWWKH
ory-building (Zimmernan and Pollner). The routes to CA, via Sacks, and to both discourse 
analysis (DA) and %RXUGLHX¶VUHIOH[LYLW\YLD=LPPHUPDQDQG3ROOQHUFDQEHPDSSHGRXW
from these initial interpretations of how topic±UHVRXUFHFDQEHµVROYHG¶ 
Dissolving the problems 
The assumptions made in these accounts of what topic±resource is and how it might be 
µVROYHG¶DOWKRXJKSHUYDVLYHDUHQRWHVVHQWLDO%RWK6DFNVDQG=LPPHUPDQDQG3ROOQHUPDNH
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DVHWRIDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHµSUREOHP¶WKDWDUHSHUKDSVXQQHFHVVDU\7KHVHUest on the no-
tion that everyday understandings should be solely the topic and never the resource of socio-
logical descriptions and investigations²DSSDUHQWO\LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK*DUILQNHO¶V(1964) in-
junction. The fundamental problems here are WKDWµHYHU\GD\XQGHUVWDQGLQJV¶DUHWUHDWHGDVD
coherent and fixed body of phenomena, that these phenomena have a problematic relation-
ship to sociological descriptions, and that a principled reconciliation of the two is required to 
HQVXUHµVFLHQWLILF¶RUDWOHDVWFRQFHSWual) integrity. 
These rather deeper assumptions need not be made. The very early Garfinkel was heavily re-
liant on Schütz in setting out his project, and his comments on topic±resource are best under-
stood in that way. Schütz (e.g., Schuetz, 1945), it should be remembered, argued that scien-
tific rationality and scientific theorising were not separate to everyday life but modifications 
of it²variations of the natural attitude7KHQDWXUDODWWLWXGHLVWKHµSDUDPRXQWUHDOLW\¶DQG
other ways of experiencing the world (e.g., dreams, experiencing a dramatic performance, 
and so on) are temporary ways of seeing things differently experienced within it. Scientific 
rationality, in this understanding, is simply the addition of four extra criteria for evaluating 
something as rational added to the mundane everyday understandings of rationality used all 
the time (Garfinkel, 1960). 
,QWKLVVHQVH*DUILQNHO¶VFRPPHQWVRQWRSLFDQGUHVRXUFHUHODWHWRWKHSUREOHPDWLFUHODWLRQ
ship between everyday and scientific rationalities whHUHWKHµHYHU\GD\¶LVLWVHOIDWRSLFRIHQ
TXLU\6RFLRORJ\LVLQHYLWDEO\DµVHFRQG-RUGHU¶GLVFLSOLQH (Schutz, 1954), depending on eve-
ryday understandings and mundane categories both as phenomena of interest and²inevita-
bly²as resources for analysis. This is the topic±resource problem: how this situation can be 
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managed, not how it can be overcome. *DUILQNHO¶VFRPPHQWWKDWVRFLRORJLVWVµhave had too 
much to do with common sense knowledge of social structures as both a topic and a resource 
for their inquiries aQGQRWHQRXJKWRGRZLWKLWRQO\DQGH[FOXVLYHO\DVVRFLRORJ\¶VSURJUDP
matic topic¶VKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHUHDGQRWZLWKWKHHPSKDVLVRQµRQO\DQGH[FOXVLYHO\¶EXW
UDWKHURQµWRRPXFK¶DQGµQRWHQRXJK¶%XWKRZFDQWKLVEHDFKLHYHG" 
Garfinkel himself is little help here. He abandoned the topic±resource issue after 1970, when 
he acknowledged that language use is always embedded in the circumstances of its use²for 
members of society, sociologists and scientists alike²DQGSRLQWHGRXWWKDWµIRUPXODWLRQV¶
(descriptions of settings) tend to be attempts to repair ambiguities²which may or may not 
succeed²rather than descriptions in any formal or scientific way. Garfinkel also abandoned 
Schütz as an analytical resource, moving instead towards Husserl and Merleau-Ponty for 
philosophical ammunition. His subsequent arguments that studies of the social world should 
be hybrids between sociology and the practices being described, and that analysts conducting 
such studies should themselves be expert practitioners in the fields of enquiry, are not models 
of clarity and their implications are confusing even to his own followers (Garfinkel & 
Wieder, 1992; Lynch, 1993). 
A topic±resource tradition that could have been taken further, however, was similarly aban-
doned. The ways concepts, formulations and other terms of reference are used provides a fas-
cinating and under-UHVHDUFKHGDUHDIRULQYHVWLJDWLRQ%LWWQHU¶V(1965) careful deconstruction 
of the sociologicaOWHUPVµEXUHDXFUDF\¶DQGµRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶WKURXJKDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIKRZ
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those terms are used in practice²and the practices their use warrants²provides a good ex-
ample of what such an analysis might look likH%LWWQHU¶VFULWLTXHRIWRSLFVEHLQJXVHGDVUH
sourFHVLVVLPLODUWRRWKHUV¶ 
[I]f the theory of bureaucracy is a theory at all, it is a refined and purified version 
RIWKHDFWRUV¶WKHRUL]LQJ7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWLWLVDUHILQHPHQWDQGSXULILFDWLRQRILW
it is, by the same token, a corrupt and incomplete version of it; for it is certainly 
not warranted to reduce the terms of common-sense discourse to a lexicon of cul-
turally coded significances to satisfy the requirements of theoretical postulation 
(Bittner, 1965, p. 246). 
But, unlike those outlined above it is a practical rather than a programmatic matter: 
In general, there is nothing wrong with borrowing a common-sense concept for 
the purposes of sociological inquiry. Up to a certain point it is, indeed, unavoida-
ble. The warrant for this procedure is the soFLRORJLVW¶VLQWHUHVWLQH[SORULQJWKH
common-sense perspective. The point at which the use of common-sense con-
cepts becomes a transgression is where such concepts are expected to do the ana-
lytical work of theoretical concepts. When the actor is treated as a permanent 
auxiliary to the enterprise of sociological inquiry at the same time that he is the 
object of its inquiry, there arise ambiguities that defy clarification (Bittner, 1965, 
p. 241). 
:LHGHU¶V(1974) H[DPLQDWLRQRIKRZWKHµFRQYLFWFRGH¶LVXVHGWR elaborate the sense of ac-
tivities in a post-prison halfway house, and in turn is elaborated by those activities, provides 
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another example. It is impossible not to use everyday concepts to understand the workings of 
the social world, but to understand any RQHLWPD\EHVXIILFLHQWWRµEUDFNHW¶LW²to be indiffer-
ent to its apparent meaning and examine how it is deployed and used in practice²so as to 
clarify what for members of society that concept does. This radically changes the role of the 
sociologist in conducting investigations: 
While no longer living naively in the practical intentions of daily life, he attempts 
to live within the methods of inquiry of that practical life and then to withdraw 
DQGUHIOHFWRQWKHPZKLOHµUHGXFLQJ¶WKHPWRPHUHPHWKRGVRILQTuiry and the 
correlative objects of inquiry²both objects inquired into and reported about 
(Wieder, 1977, p. 8). 
Recognising that language and other activities are intrinsically linked, and that that link can-
not be broken, does not mean the end of sociology any more than it means the end of ordi-
nary understanding. We do make sense of the world, the world is overwhelmingly orderly, 
and²when required²we can say just what is going on in a setting in ways that others can 
recognise and agree (or disagree) with. This provides sociology with a technical problem, and 
RQHZKLFKUHTXLUHVDWHFKQLFDOVROXWLRQ7KHPRGHVW\RI%LWWQHU¶VDQG:LHGHU¶VDSSURDFKHV
DQGWKHVHQVLWLYHFRQWHQWRIWKHLUGHVFULSWLRQVVHHPVWRLQGLFDWHWKDWµSULQFLSOHG¶VROXWLRQVWR
such problems are often more trouble than they are worth. 
One of the central problems afflicting contemporary social theory²and ethnomethodological 
practice²is muddled thinking about the relationships between language and other practical 
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activities. A second is the relationship between sociological descriptions and ordinary under-
standings. The fact that these remain apparently intractable, and attempts to solve them have 
IUHTXHQWO\HQGHGXSDVIXGJHVSHUKDSVLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHµSUREOHP¶RIWRSLFDQGUHVRXUFHUH
quires revisiting. 
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